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This paper discusses the extent to which a new industrial
relations system including greater participation in decision making
by workers and unions has diffused in the American economy. The
paper uses the automobile as an illustrative case. The paper
includes examination of the factors that have limited the diffusion
of new industrial relations in the auto industry and elsewhere.
A Transformation in Industrial Relations?
Kochan, McKersie and I (KKM) claim that a major transformation
is occurring in American industrial relations.' There are many
dimensions to this transformation including a shift in the focus
of industrial relations activity away from the '~collecti ve
bargaining" to the "strategic" and "workplace" levels. Perhaps
most controversial is our assertion that in a number of unionized
settings a new system of industrial relations is emerging. The new
system includes more contingent compensation, team systems of work
organization, employment security programs, and enhanced worker and
union participation in decision making. In contrast to the
traditional arms-length and formal nature of collective bargaining,
the new system involves more continuous and informal relations
between workers and managers.
The new industrial relations also involves changes in the
barqaining process. Process changes include a decentralization
in bargaining structure; more direct communication between
management and the workforce; and a more direct role for financial
and operating managers in the negotiation and administration of
2work rules and labor contracts. There is widespread agreement that
these process changes have occurred (although less agreement about
the consequences). Thus, this paper focuses around the evidence
and controversy surrounding the industrial relations system
outcomes (practices).
An Illustration: The Automobile Industry
The American automobile industry provides a rich illustration
of new industrial relations practices and is often cited in the
debates concerning the new practices. The auto industry receives
so much attention from the press and academics because the industry
has long served as a pattern setter and innovator within American
~
collective bargaining.
The following discussion focuses on developments within the
Big Three (General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler) and the UAW although
similar changes have occurred in the independent auto parts sector.2
Contingent Compensation
From 1948 until 1979, Big Three contracts with the UAW always
included annual cost of living increases (providing 90-100 percent
protection from inflation) and annual improvement factor wage
increases (since 1955 these were 3 percent per year). Autoworker
earnings were made more contingent on corporate performance than
these traditional wage formulas when profit sharing was introduced
into the Big Three contracts with the UAW in the early 1980s. The
profit sharing plans provide annual payouts that vary as a function
3of company profits. Profit sharing has continued in subsequent
agreements, including the 1990-93 contracts signed in the Fall of
1990.
The introduction of profit sharing has led to sizeable
differences in pay across workers in the different companies. In
1987, for example, Ford hourly workers received a profit sharing
payment of $3700, while workers at General Motors (GM) received no
payment, and workers at Chrysler received a $500 profit sharing
payment. Most of this variation was due to differences in the
financial performance of the companies, with Ford earning record
profits and GM suffering substantial declines in market share over
the mid and late 1980s.
The introduction of profit sharing was accompanied by the use
of lump sum wage increases. Annual lump sums have been paid in the
Big Three contracts negotiated since 1982. The lump sums increases
have varied between 2 and 3 percent. In some sense, the lump sum
wage increases also are a form of contingent pay in that they are
not automatic and their size varies somewhat as a function of how
well the auto companies are doing financially at the moment a new
labor contract is negotiated.
At the shop floor level in a number of auto plants, another
variant of contingent pay has been introduced through the
introduction of pay-for-knowledge schemes linking worker pay and
skill competence. Under these pay systems workers receive more pay
(often 50 cents per pay step) as they prove competence in a wider
variety of jobs in their respective work area. In the past a
4worker's wage was set strictly on the basis of the job
classification of the worker. There had been very little
variation across work areas in a plant, across plants, and across
companies in the wage rates assigned to particular occupations.
Thus, in the past assembly line workers across the Big Three all
received nearly identical wage rates. Currently, as a result of
,
pay-for-knowledge, some assemblers earn up to $2.00 per hour more
than other assemblers.
pay variation also emerged between autoworkers in the u.s.
and Canada in the 1980s. The UAW had worked hard in the immediate
post World War II period to raise the pay of Canadian autoworkers
up to the earnings of American workers. The UAW then ba~gained for
equality in autoworker nominal pay across the border. The union
pursued pay standardization here, as elsewhere, so as to eliminate
any incentive for management to shift production to low cost
regions. With the secession of the Canadian auto workers from the
UAW (and the formation of the CAW) in 1985, pay standardization
across u.s. and Canadian autoworkers was ended. The CAW refused
to accept profit sharing into their labor contracts and instead,
continued annual improvement factors wage increases, although they
did not always gain the traditional 3 percent figure.J
Teams
Team systems of work organization have spread throughout many
of the Big Three plants. Although the form of teams varies
substantially across plants, all the teams involve a shift away
5from the traditional numerous job classifications. A typ~c;al t~
requires workers to perform some machine maintenance, h,-ous~keepini f
repair, and inspection duties in addition to normal tasks. In some
teams workers rotate across job tasks and some teams use pay-foK~
knowledge. In some extreme cases, teams are led by hourly "t~a.m
coordinators" who perform many of the tasks that were traditional~¥
carried out by supervisors. These coordinators continue to :Re
represented by the UAW. 1
There has been much debate concerning the effects of t~m
systems. Often in these debates, as at the workplace, t~e
operation of teams is closely linked to greater worker and un~n
participation in decision making and employment security programs.
.
So, this paper describes these other industrial re~ations chan~s




Employment (and Income) Security
.
In the traditional auto industrial relations system workers
were laid off when recessions produced declines in auto sales. The
UAW had negotiated a number of programs to provide income
protection to employees during these temporary layoffs, the most
important were the supplemental unemployment insurance benefi~s
(SUB) paid in addition to government provided unemployment
insurance benefits.
In the 1980s, the Big Three-UAW contracts included a number
of employment and income security programs. The Jobs Ban~,
Jobs Bank provides that if workers are laid off for reasons that
were in the control of the company (layoffs due to technological
change, corporate reorganization, outsourcing, or negotiated
6
introduced in the 1984 contracts, was the major innovation. The
productivity improvements) the workers receive full compensation
while placed in a "jobs bank". Notably, the Jobs Bank program in
the 1984-87 and 1987-90 contracts did not protect workers laid off
due to volume related reasons. As a result, in the mid and late
1980s, when GM's market share fell, many GM workers were laid and
did not qualify for the Jobs Bank (they did receive SUB benefits
or transfer opportunities).
For workers covered by the Jobs Bank and other new.employment
security programs there is less frequent recourse. to layoff (even
in the face of business downturns) and more secure career
attachment to the firm. In GM's Job Bank program, for example,
workers displaced by new technology sometimes are placed in
retraining programs. The degree to which this new program actually
provides valuable retraining to the workforce varies substantially
across auto plants.. Nonetheless, the Job Bank and other programs
provide covered workers in the auto assembly firms with work
careers that looks more like the traditional employment security
possessed by white collar workers in the U.S..
At the same time the new employment security programs
encourage the auto assemblers to rely more extensively on either
temporary and part-time workers or greater overtime to respond to
fluctuations in auto demand. At GM's Packard Electric division,
7for example, the negotiation of employment security for existing
employees was accompanied by an expansion in the use of temporary
and part-time employees.' In this way the expansion of the new
industrial relations system will have the byproduct of making the
u.s. employment structure look more like a dual structure. This
shift, not coincidentally, makes the u.s. employment structure more
similar to that found in Japan.'
The 1990-93 contract made a major change by extending the Jobs
Bank to workers laid off for volume related reasons. The 1990-93
contracts provide that during the term of the three year ag;eement,
a worker cannot be laid off for longer than 36 weeks. Once a
worker has been on layoff they are to be recalled to work or
receive full pay while placed in a Jobs Bank.
The 1990-93 contract also provides a number of other new
features that increase the compensation provided to workers
affected by layoff or plant closings. SUB and early retirement
benefits, for example, are greatly expanded. The contract provides
that GM alone is liable for up to $4 billion in additional payouts
to workers under the expanded income security programs.
The auto companies (and to some extent the UAW as well) were
hoping that the expansion of various employment and income security
programs would strengthen the link between employees and the
companies. One of the reasons GM agreed to the new $4.0 billion
liability is the company's guess that it would not have to payout
much of the money. The company hoped that further layoffs and
8plant closings would be avoided in part as a result of productivity
improvements.
Thus, in many ways the latest income security programs should
be seen as a form of insurance. The workers give up payor other
potential contract improvements in exchange for these programs.
Meanwhile, the auto companies do not have to payout as long as
,
they manage to avoid extensive layoffs and plant closings.7
The parties hoped that these programs would reduce workers'
fears that productivity improvements would lead to worker
displacement and this would spur workers to agree to restructure
work. The companies and the UAW created various committees
operating at the plant level to develop more effective work
practices.
It is, of course, possible that income and employment security
programs have an effect that goes exactly in the opposite direction
from what the companies' hoped. These new (and expanded programs)
reduce the hardships workers face if companies lose market share
and close more plants. It is possible that the reduction in these
hardships leads workers to be more complacent and less enthusiastic
about changing work practices. In the face of the new programs,
workers have less to lose if they maintain traditional work
practices. It remains to be seen whether the new security programs
actually spur productivity improvements.
Participation Processes
9Workers and union officials have acquired increased
participation through a number of channels in the new industrial
relations system. Team systems, for example, involve workers in
a broader variety of tasks. Some teams workers even have become
involved in budget and planning. In a number of auto plants hourly
workers now have the authority to contact vendors and parts
suppliers directly, and some workers make regular trips to these
vendors to resolve complaints.
union officers now spend much more of their work time in
meetings with management. In some plants unions officers serve on
"administrative" committees that direct plant operations. GM's
Saturn plant represents an extreme case. At Saturn, the president
of the UAW local is a member of the executive management committee.
This committee decides matters including picking vendors to supply
parts. In this role, the union president must decide how much to
weight unionization as a factor in parts purchases. The local
union president at Saturn already has been criticized for agreeing
to parts purchases from nonunion plants. In point of fact, a high
percentage of Saturn's parts come from unionized suppliers.
Nevertheless, this well illustrates the kinds of criticism union
officers are opened to in the face of their involvement in
strategic business issues.
Workers and union officers also participate in strategic
issues in the auto industry through a number of other committees
and joint activities. These range from plant level committees
concerned with productivity and quality enhancement to quarterly
10
forums where the companies report their business plans. In some
plants union officers are now a part of the management committees
that provide plant input into corporate strategic planning.
The Debate Surrounding the New Practices
A serious challenge to the KKM thesis comes from those who
believe that we completely mischaracterize the nature of new
industrial relations practices. According to these critics, the
current period does amount to a transformation, but it is a
transformation defined by a substantial increase in management's
control of industrial relations.' KKM claim that there are new
experiments (and possibilities) involving greater worker and union
involvement in decision making. In contrast, the critics argue
that new practices produce hyper-Tayloristic practices, a speed-
up in the pace of work, and the weakening of worker rights. KKM
see the emergence of team systems as a shift toward higher skill
work and mechanisms to involve workers in the coordination and
direction of work tasks. The critics claim that teams are a device
to eliminate traditional worker protections and introduce a system
of "management-by-stress".'
Academics are not the only parties arguing about whether the
restructuring of industrial relations is focused on a speed-up in
the pace of work and the avoidance (or weakening) of unions. In
the auto industry the "New Directions" movement reflects these
sentiments and there are similar militant groups opposing joint
labor-management programs in other industries. Although the New
11
Directions candidates failed in their recent efforts to win
executive positions in the UAW, support for their positions on the
shop floor is not trivial.IO
In fact, it is my sense that the militant opponents to
"jointness" (joint labor-management programs and activities) have
greater support among the workforce on the shop floor than their
limited electoral success inside unions would suggest. IWhy haven't
the militants been elected to union offices in even greater number?
The electoral weaknesses of the militant opponents to work
reorganization in auto (and other industries) in part derive from
the fact that the militants have not yet articulated a clear and
comprehensive alternative strategy. To date, their main criticism
of "cooperative" unionists in the UAW and elsewhere boils down to
the charge that it was possible to win more from management.
The militants argue that harder bargaining could maintain
traditional union work standards while at the same time win more
concrete employment assurances than those won to date by the
cooperatists. Yet, the supporters of New Directions and other
militants have not clarified how this all could be accomplished.
As a result the militants have a hard time overcoming the appeal
of the cooperatists who claim that joint cost control efforts and
restructuring will save jobs.
Yet even if the militants were able to more clearly articulate
an alternati ve strategy, ultimately their political strength inside
the American labor movement may prove to be limited. New
Directions and other militants have to contend with the historical
12
absence of ideological opposition to capitalism within the UAW and
the American workforce. The workforce has long been deeply
suspicious of managements' motives (often for very good reasons)
in the auto industry and elsewhere. Yet, this suspicion rarely has
been translated into deep rooted proqrammatic opposition to
management's objectives.
The American labor movement has been characterized (and
distinguished) by its pragmatic approach to industrial conflict.
Typically, in the current scene this pragmatism leads the wor~force
and union officials to be willing to at least try joint programs.
The joint process frequently starts through the initiation of a
joint labor-management committee given the task of improving a
plant's viability by analyzing competitors' costs ~nd productivity.
Such a process often begins under the presence or threat of the
outsourcing of work, business volume declines, or some other threat
to employment in a plant. Where the joint process takes hold it
goes on to consider how industrial relations restructuring in the
plant can be linked to the reorganization of management and/or
manufacturing procedures to answer competitive threats.
The actual negotiation of the "productivity coalitions" that
often follow these joint discussions is no easy matter and in fact,
is often extremely fragile. Nonetheless, the workforce and
American unions seem to be willing to make a try at these efforts
and see where they lead.
While they are often willing to give jointness a try, from
what I have observed, American unionists are rarely duped by
13
managements who use jointness primarily as a device to speed the
pace of work and/or weaken the workforces loyalty to the union.
unionists usually enter trial joint processes ever mindful of
previous managerial betrayals and new betrayals of the principles
of jointness quickly lead unionists to withdraw from a joint
program. If anything, the unions' and workers' willingness to
,
engage in cooperative experiments concerning the use of work teams
and the like recently has been enhanced by reports coming from some
sites of the continuation of productivity coalitions and strong
unionism on the shop floor {a possibility the militants deny}.
It is interesting to note that the different interpretations
of the consequences of work reorganization do not ari~ from the
fact that the two sides are looking at different cases. On the
contrary, the very same worksites, such as the NUMMI plant {jointly
owned by GM-Toyota} and other auto plants, are viewed by some as
an example of enhanced participation and by others as an
illustration of hyper-Taylorism. II
Such contrasting interpretations can be drawn from the same
cases in part because of the nature of the changes underway on the
shop floor. In the face of height~ned international and domestic
non-union competition many unionized firms have struggled to lower
production costs. One would be hard pressed to find a unionized
workplace in the u.S. that after 1979 did not experience changes
in work rules that entailed the tightening of production standards,
reductions in manning levels, and a relaxation in the role of
seniority in job transfers and assignments. 12 Consequently, few
14
would quarrel with the claim that for unionized workers the pace
and difficulty of work has intensified in the 1980s. On this score
the critics of teams and work reorganization are surely right.
But the pace of work is not the issue that divides the two
positions. The central question is whether in their efforts to
lower production costs American management has begun to experiment
with a decentralization in decision making authority in the factory
and a system of industrial relations that allows broader roles for
workers and their union representatives. The critics claim that
American management either will not (because of ideological
predilection) or cannot (because of the nature of capitalism) allow
such a reorganization of work.13
critics of work reorganization have a difficult time
explaining why management did not merely speed up the traditional
production and industrial relations systems in their efforts to
lower costs. I became most convinced that work rule changes were
part of a serious rethinking of managerial practice when I observed
that management was not solely choosing the simpler and more direct
route of speed up. Yet, since intensification of work and work
reorganization are occurring simultaneously it is no surprise that
the debate is confused and the evidence is mixed.
Of course, it is difficult to learn how much influence the
union or the workers actually exercise in strategic discussions and
the mere existence of labor input does not conclusively refute the
critics claim that such input is superficial or cooptive. Clearly,
much more research has to be done to identify the staying power and
15
scope of this strategic participation. We need to know more fully
if unions can and have used such participation to change
management's decisions and whether such involvement expands once
it is set in motion. strategic issues often take much time to
resolve themselves and even if union involvement were clear,
decisions still have to be followed to ascertain the influence of
labor's involvement.
Evidence From Other Industries
There is evidence that many of the changes discussed above are
occurring in many other industries and companies. Comprehensive
data across industries are lacking, nevertheless, indiqative data
are available. The best recent data come from a GAO study and this
data suggests that there is a fairly sizeable spread of a number
of the features of the new industrial relations system. 1. KKM and
others also have identified cases in the steel, airlines, machine
tool and trucking industries. In the public schools there have
been experiments and debates concerning the role of teachers in
peer review and curriculum (what are essentially strategic issues
in the KKM framework)."
What about the nonunion sector in the U.S.? Is there evidence
of a transformation in work practices there as well? In the non-
union sector it is useful to distinguish the practices of those
non-union firms utilizing what KKM call sophisticated human
resource management policies and those firms that practice
traditional forms of autocracy and paternalism. KKM outline the
16
organization of work in the sophisticated employers and sketch out
the post World War II evolution of these practices. Yet, detailed
evidence on the current workplace practices of non-union employers
is extremely limited.
There is some recent evidence indicating the emergence of a
bifurcation of job opportunities in the nonunion sector (and
elsewhere in the American economy).
,
Firms may be able to acquire
flexibility through their reliance on more "contingent" employment
relationships with greater part-time, temporary, or sub-contracted
labor. Christopherson and stolper, for example, suggest that such
practices have spread in the movie industry as that industry
shifted towards a corporate and product form that looks,similar to
"flexible specialization"." Noyelle claims that the collapse of
internal labor markets in a number of service industries is a
result of a similar shift towards flexible specialization. 17
In these cases there are some employees, such as technicians
and independent producer-financiers in the movie industry and
buyers in the retail clothes industry, who experience a merger of
conceptual and manual tasks. Thus, these cases provide some
support that there is upskilling. But there are many other workers
(who may be in the majority) in these industries who suffer a
deterioration in employment conditions. Furthermore, in the 1980s
the American income distribution became more unequal, reversing a
modest shift to greater equality that occurred over the late 1960s
and early 1970s.1I
17
The Role of Union strategy
The diff icu1ty in determining whether the U.s. employment
structure is traveling down a path of higher skills and worker
participation or just the opposite arises from the nature of recent
changes as much from a lack of information. There is no reason to
believe that all firms, industries or industrial sectors should
necessarily follow the same development path. KKM suggest the
important role that strategic choice plays in industrial relations
change and there is good reason to believe that firms differ
sUbstantially in how they chose to respond to given environmental
pressures." Thus, employment practices may evolve along different
courses either because environmental pressures vary b~ sector or
because labor and management exercise important choices in the
course of development.
Economic pressures themselves also contain the roots of
diversity in employment conditions. Since cost reduction can be
accomplished by speeding up the pace of work and by reorganizations
of the production system, it is not surprising that some firms will
initially proceed along a mixed strategy that tries to combine
these adjustments. Thus, even if sizeable parts of the economy
were to head down a reorganization (upski11ing) strategy it would
not be surprising to observe the sort of sluggish growth in real
income and the increasing inequality that has appeared in the U.S.
in recent years. Clearly, more research is needed to identify the
extent to which participation is spreading as well as trends in
skill requirements.
18
The Dilemmas Facing Union Leaders
The labor movement does not have the luxury to wait for
researchers to clarify exactly where firms and the labor market are
heading. On the shop floor labor leaders face a multi-dimensional
problem as they confront managements eager to modify work rules.
Even if local union leaders conclude that management at their
worksite is primarily oriented toward speeding up work pace, union
leaders (and the workforce) must decide whether the employment
gains from such a speed-up are worth the sacrifice. In such a
situation labor leaders might also strive to improve the terms of
the trade-off by encouraging an upskilling-pa~ticipatory
reorganization strategy. But playing out such
~
strategy is no
simple exercise. Often union leaders are put in the awkward
position of trying to identify what management is up to while they
simultaneously 'struggle to develop plans for a more positive
adjustment strategy. The former is complicated by the widespread
confus ion that exists within management's own ranks concerning
their choice of strategy.
Where they fail to convince management to pursue
reorganization and decide that the employment gains from speed-up
are not worthwhile, union officers must prepare their organizations
for the conflictual tactics necessary to oppose these measures.
Although preparing for conflict is difficult, given the prevailing
uncertainty in management's intentions and the environment, at the
least, if it comes to conflict the union can rely on a repertoire
19
of traditional tactics. Furthermore, in the face of sophisticated
managerial strategies the labor movement recently has begun to
employ pressure tactics that fall short of strikes and rely on
"workplace strategies". These workplace strategies include working
to rule, sick outs and the like.2O
The development of strategy for the labor movement becomes
more difficult if the reorganization of work and
,
industrial
relations proceeds, although the returns may be greater. The new
system of industrial relations demands from union leaders novel
,.
roles and union structures. 21 On the shop floor more continuous and
informal relations with management demands non-traditional skills
and personalities.
The union also faces the difficult task of resolving competing
advantages provided by the new industrial relations system. Team
systems, for example, are often most advantageous to younger
workers who gain access to broader and more interesting jobs.
These are the sort of jobs which in the traditional seniority
system are only available to high seniority workers. More senior
workers meanwhile often are resentful of the losses in entitlements
brought by the new system. Mediating across these competing claims
is at least in principle not foreign to labor unions and successful
compromises provide some role for seniority rights within work
teams or in cross-team transfers.
More severe issues derive from unions' need to rethink their
basic bargaining and organizational structures in the new
industrial relations system. Here one problem arises from the fact
20
that the new system involves greater diversity in employment
conditions across work groups, plants and companies. In the past
unions strove to impose standardization so as to reduce invidious
competition. Yet, in the new system diversi ty in employment
practices across work groups is an important source of innovation
and flexibility. The unions need to develop mechanisms to
coordinate and communicate across work sites. But the wnole
subject of work rules, teams and related practices are now so
controversial that it is difficult for unions to discuss what is
going on, let alone to create coordinated policies.
Given the extent of change and the ambiguities surrounding
~,
the possibilities for change, labor and management clearly have a
.
full plate in front of them.
21
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